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The intergeneradonal problems of indigence, poverty and social dysfunction
that plague African societies are inextricably grounded in the broader issue of
ethnocentrism in neoclassical microeconomics.

Economic anthropology provides a

methodological critique of the conceptual limitations of neoclassical micro-behavioral
assumptions narrowly imposed on non-westem economic organization. While
recognizing non-westem economic praxes, the sociological implications of strict
neoclassical microeconomic agency for non-westem socioeconomic development is
conspicuously ignored.

The critique fails to specifically consider the impact of

neoclassical ethnocentrism to non-westem sociocultural organization and improvement
This research utilizes an African-centered, social psychological approach to
examine the paradigmatic implications of rational choice criteria for microeconomic
agency within African sociocultural organization.

Rational choice criteria appear

incapable of resolving African underdevelopment since they engender normative
behavioral expectations that interdict the social reproduction o f African cultural praxis.
The simultaneity of diametric behavioral expectations and deep structural impetuses
establishes

meta-axiological

dilemma

as

propagative

social

conditions

for

underdevelopment.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem o f African Development

This dissertation intends to address a glaring absence within economic
discourse of the implications for socioeconomic development o f African cultural
propensities that predate the colonial legacy. Such a deficiency supports immature
exegeses on African socioeconomic development that merely affirm the impact of
colonialism and western relativism while disregarding the painfully obvious issue of
"How?". A continued disregard for African cultural propensities discounts both the
significance and consonance o f residual non-Westem objective realities. Furthermore,
it raises concern over the extent to which an imposed social manicheism remains
entrenched yet unchallenged within development theory and research. An alternative
view o f the persistence o f underdevelopment is herein presented as positively related
to the extent to which the neoclassical microeconomic paradigm frames African
microeconomic agency.

1
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The Nature of Underdevelopment?

Over three decades o f formal interventions in African socioeconomic
development can hardly be characterized as dismal; ineffective would appear an
exceedingly more accurate description. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, threequarters o f the world population living within developing countries generated a
penurious twenty percent o f the total world production o f goods and services,
twenty-five percent o f world export earnings, and escalated its foreign debt by well
over six hundred percent (World Bank, 1980, 1983,1986; IMF, 1986, 1989). For the
75 million people in developing African nations, an impoverishing combination of
balance o f payment crises, increased food and capital importation, precipitous
commodity prices, skewed and declivitous real per capita incomes and soaring debt
persisted well into the austere 1980s. At present over half o f the “Sub-Saharan”
countries are severely indebted, with debt-service ratios surpassing forty percent in
some instances. A forty-eight percent decline in the commodity price index in 1989
alone effectuated a fifty billion dollar loss for the Africa region, providing continued
evidence that “Sub-Saharan” economies remain heavily dependent on volatile primary
commodities for desperately needed foreign exchange earnings (World Bank, 1989).
Also in the same year, regional agricultural and industrial contributions fell from fifty
to thirty percent, with investment scarcely more than fifteen percent o f GDP. These
trends forced many “Sub-Saharan” nations like Zambia to face revised World Bank
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classification and the conditional financial access it entails.

Inflation in Zambia

reached 122 percent at the close o f 1989.1 Its consumer prices increased by as much
as sixty percent, with disaggregated indices showing a 144 percent increase in
consumer durables and a 138 percent increase among non-durables. Statistically,
“dismal” does not begin to describe formal development intervention in Africa any
more than it captures the continent’s socioeconomic pejoration. Ineffective is
exceedingly more accurate.
Economic and social dislocations abound throughout Africa, and there is little
reason to anticipate a reversal o f these worsening trends. Relief can hardly be hoped
for by those living at life’s margin in the “Sub-Saharan” region. Residual colonial
infrastructures continue to deteriorate through disrepair and inattention. The ranks of
the impoverished and indigent continue to swell as sporadic internecine conflicts
further marginalize civilian populations. Health care in the post-colonial era is ju st as
remote and educational opportunity just as difficult to secure. Decades o f foreign aid,
questionable industrialization and investment strategies, and immiserizing structural
adjustment programming have managed only to further enfeeble structurally weak and
politically mismanaged economies, to further impoverish indigenous populations, and
to further deepen ubiquitous despair, trepidation, and legendary suffering.

1 As cited in the article Inflation Hits 122% Mark. (1990, February 2). The Daily
Mail, Zambia.
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Just what has gone wrong with socioeconomic development in Africa?

Is

there something inherent in the very nature o f underdevelopment that makes
development an impossible task? Historically, no shortcut to development shy of
deferring to the presumably catholic post-war models o f reconstruction and growth
looms apparent. And the absence o f an alternative paradigm that is methodologically
contradistinct to the conventional conversion or indigenization models (see Mudimbe,
1985), yet tolerant the reformative spirit o f AAF-SAP2 encourages repeating in the
1990s the very modes of intervention that have further entrenched African
impoverishment.

Neoclassical Approach to Development

Neoclassical diagnoses o f Africa’s economic ills remain conceptually moored
to indices sensitive only to colonial-era methodologies and which presume to abstract
the macrodynamics of western economies (e.g., per capital income, the Gini
coefficient, capital-labor ratios, and others).

Moreover, these neoclassical indices

estrange African economies from those sociocultural realities that managed to survive
an obstructive and repressive colonial legacy.

As the dominant method of

2 The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAFSAP), introduced in to UN General Assembly in 1988, concerns itself with
establishing economic reform in accordance with requirements for addressing Third
Wold deb t It consists of four central points designed to accommodate structural
adjustment programmes to wit: (I) democratization o f the development process, (2)
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socioeconomic development, the neoclassical paradigm posits a praxeological
perspective on the persistence o f African underdevelopment which imputes the
quality of “backwardness” or general state o f underdevelopment to a “special case” o f
non-rational behavioral propensities that impede otherwise normally functioning,
self-equilibrating, free market dynamics (Leibenstein, 1957; Baran, 1961, 1968; Bauer,
1981; Fei & Ranis, 1964, 1966; Lindert & Kinderburger, 1983; Herrick &
Kinderburger, 1983; Meier, 1984). From this paradigm, various strategies for African
development ranging in approach from the basic needs, growth with equity, and
dependencia o f the 1960s to the structural adjustment programs o f the 1980s derive
methodological significance.

Through them, virtually everything behaviorally

disparate and inconsistent with Western “rationality” appears causally suspect and
pathological rather than causally indicative o f the root o f underdevelopment —
whether its the bovine nature of political decision-m aking, draconian legal codes,
misguided public

administrators, uninspired

entrepreneurs,

or

disinterested

professionals and consumers. The neoclassical notion o f development is conceptually
restricted to a social process that promotes the maximization o f productive and
allocative efficiencies in functional macro-level relationships between four key
variables: production, capital, labor and savings (Jones, 1976; Solow, 1988).
Therefore for socioeconomic growth to occur in underdeveloped societies, their non-

indigenization of development, (3) regard for the human aspect of development, and
(4) full mobilization o f resources.
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rational behaviors which the neoclassical perspective identifies as pathological would
appear to require exorcising from the conditions o f underdevelopment, not
explanations that are methodologically recondite and praxeologically remote.
In building upon the classicals’ methodological tradition, the neoclassicals’
strict analytical framework predicating formal approaches to development emphasizes
quantitative growth and efficiency among predetermined units o f analysis: variables
whose African performance are regarded as endemially occluded within a larger
superintending and highly protean global economy. Research in national economic
growth approaches the development problem largely from the basis o f simple
aggregated system concepts, with growth commonly associated with aggregate capital
accumulation. This approach is cast in the Harrod-Domar extension of the Keynesian
model. In the empirical setting o f underdeveloped societies, the problem is framed by
a preoccupation with displacing lagging economies with forms of microeconomic
behavior that conform more closely to Western normative standards. The rate o f
development is associated with expectant patterns o f capital accumulation and
renewed sources o f savings and investment. Neoclassical theoretical concepts have
been extended in two principal directions, with greater attention being given the
allocation o f investment between development options. One o f these directions is the
occasional attempt to

identify necessary growth sequences or “stages” o f

development in the interest o f producing a more dynamic framework for prediction
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and planning (Rostow, 1960).

One trend occurring in this direction includes

considering development in the context of more complex functional systems, which
seeks to extend time horizons and perspectives. Clearly a restive search is under way
for concepts that are more relevant to interpretation o f the harsh realities disclosed by
experience.
For the neoclassical economist, African underdevelopment presents itself as a
“special case” o f complex behavioral and institutional constraints to otherwise
normally functioning market dynamics. The neoclassical analytical framework lies
contradistinct to alternative Marxian perspectives which affirm constraints —whether
global, national, or in the context o f a community —resulting from the siphoning of
wealth by macrostructures created by equally suspect modes o f production. To the
extent that the more substantive, more structurally-oriented position within these
perspectives maintains that which corrupts an essential, mutually inclusive
relationship between social and material production is institutional and therefore
behavioral, and that institutions cum infrastructure contribute to underdevelopment,
these seemingly internecine economic perspectives find middle ground in conceding
that a poorly developed infrastructure contributing to the absence o f a foundation for
“modem” socioeconomic growth cannot accommodate historically proven empirical
theories for growth. Cash crop, export-oriented economic infrastructures would, for
example, require either Frank’s (1967) or dos Santos’ (1970) dependencia-styled
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adjustments, or Nurkse’s (1955) structuralist-styled adjustments through behavior
modifications that are functionally consistent with Harrod-Domar paradigmatic
relationships (see Jones, 1976) for viable growth to occur. It is upon this issue o f
institutions cum infrastructure that, as Godelier (1986) argues, a contentious moment
—a basic theme —lies weighted by the existence and substance o f a logic governing
social evolution and dynamics.

Beyond mutual concurrence on the existence of

comparatively undeveloped infrastructure, concern over the plausibility of either
perspective (that is, either structuralist or Marxist) with respect to African
development deliquesces to a solitary question of the general applicability of western
behavioral postulates imputing their presumed analytical difference more to
philosophical bases than to issues o f determinancy. Ultimately, it is consistency with
this single question and its imputation to which the reasons for over thirty years of
African development must be reconciled.
The neoclassical paradigm and its attendant assumptions o f universally
applicable strategies for socioeconomic growth set up an implicit casuistry between
exogenous albeit inured Western behavioral responses to non-indigenous cultural
stimuli and endogenous cultural norms for pre-colonial patterns o f institutional praxis.
Consequently, policy assessments overtly examine seemingly endemic empirical
problems relative to an agenda for integrating disruptive behavioral propensities into
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"rational" economic institutions.3 The regard held by researchers for residual pre
colonial African axiological constructs that inform behavioral propensities directly
challenged by Western economic institutions appears pejorative at best, and
nonexistent at w orst Static exegeses in Western socioeconomic relativism abound,
wholly imperceptible this dynamic opposition: from Nurkse's (1955) "vicious cycle
o f poverty" and Hirchman's (1958) discussion o f the futility o f investment behavior
amid the absence o f a functional link between saving propensities and investment in
LDCs to Modjeska's (1982) revelation o f sexism and discrimination in Duna
productive relations, Sahlin's (1972) contention that the dichotomy between atomistic
productive units and the "phenomenon" o f extended family grounds a "kinship to
kingship" social evolution, and Coquery-Vitrovitch's (1978) hypothesis o f an
"African" mode o f production stemming from its Asian counterpart. What is required
at this juncture in the discourse on African development is an acknowledgment o f the
existence o f subjective and objective realities in non-westem societies; one that
ventures beyond a simple cognition to excogitate from the neoclassical paradigm
antitheses to persistent, pre-colonial social praxes, and their implications for and
effectuations upon African socioeconomic development

3 See Schmoller (1884) and Cunningham (1910) for a discussion o f the mechanisms
that assisted in the transformation o f European economies from feudalism to
mercantilism.
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10
Methodological Critique o f the Neoclassical Paradigm

That a western perception o f reality and an equally western conceptualization
o f the relationship between human beings and their environment implicit in social
science research limit the predictive and evaluative efficiencies o f its paradigms when
examining non-westem social dynamics is hardly a novel hypothesis.

Nor, as

plausible imputations for paradigmatic bias, do they escape the attention o f social
scientists across diverse disciplines concerned with the methodological significance o f
these limitations for understanding behavioral modalities among racially and culturally
differentiated groups. Much o f the scholarly discourse on paradigmatic bias only
considers its evaluative implications. Analytical scope is typically restricted to issues
o f external validity, significant only in its ascription o f questionable interpretations of
non-westem reality to promiscuous hypotheses

or empirical problems of

determinancy commonly associated with difficulties in objectifying noumenal or
axiologicai characteristics o f socio-behavioral modalities. It acknowledges the spatial
and temporal conditions o f non-westem social reality, but only comparatively and in
terms o f a causal evolution toward normative standards o f refinement

With the

notable exception of the critical traditions in African (Black) psychology, African
philosophy, and Black/Africana Studies, critiques o f paradigmatic bias do generally
ignore the preconditioning o f research methodology by epistemological orientation and
the implications o f its worldview specificity for both the evaluative and predictive
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functions o f social science paradigms.

Consequently, paradigmatic assumptions

remain unchallenged, their validity persists untested, and the relativity o f their
axiologicai orientation sustains its guise o f catholicity. At issue is the role o f Western
axiologicai ethnocentrism in predicting outcomes relevant to non-westem social
dynamics: an issue whose cogency redounds more to the fact o f cultural differentials
in socioeconomic organization than to its ideological grounding in presumptions about
comparative human superiority.
This theoretical examination o f the neoclassical microeconomic paradigm aims
to broaden the analytical scope o f the Polanyi Group critique by further elaborating
its affirmation o f cultural differentiation in micro-behavioral performance to consider
the rational choice criteria implicit in the microeconomic paradigm as normative bias.
Indigenous institutional nonage and the inability to produce rational socioeconomic
outcomes is recast as a concern over a paradigmatic interdiction o f African-centered
socioeconomic praxes. The central hypothesis o f this dissertation is that Western
ethnocentrism within rational choice criteria support an idiosyncratic modality of
microeconomic agency whose consistency with the cultural orientation o f African
social organization determine its social contribution to African socioeconomic
underdevelopment. An economy is defined as instituted social relations possessing
distinct, closed sets o f well-defined social behaviors and expectations that produce,
transmit and reproduce a common experience or "worldview”. Within the neoclassical
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perspective, microeconomic behavior is represented by the characteristic properties of
a constructed utility function predicting potential economic choices deduced out from
an association of field o f preferences and set of axioms o f utilitarian choice. Six
axioms o f choice mathematically encode utilitarian assumptions about economic
behavior that mallet its functional form — a hyperbolic surface traversing axes of
measurable utility and two presumably independent commodities, physical or
otherwise —and comprise rational choice criteria for individual demand. With demand
for goods and services sociologically specified and an economy assumed fully
responsive to societal dynamics, and axiologically restricted thereby, the relationship
between the neoclassical paradigm and African underdevelopment can be investigated
through its constituent utility function by locating and examining post-colonial
discrepancies (conflict) in otherwise rational and predictable economic choices.
Conflicting axiologicai orientations prescribe different sets of normative expectations
for microeconomic agency and outcomes.

Neoclassical rational choice criteria

represent normative impositions that pillory indigenous behavioral motivations to
alien social institutions and organization which currently stand in need of
legitimization.
The social psychology o f African-centered metatheory (see Azibo, 1991;
Montgomery, Fine and James-Myers, 1990) provides an appropriate analytical
framework with which to assess the utilitarian assumptions implicit in rational choice
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criteria for correspondence to European social reality. This approach to examining
Western cultural relativism stems from a proactive, Fanonian tradition within
theoretical and empirical research on the structure and functioning o f African-centered
cognitive modalities, personality constructs, and worldview (Azibo, 1991; Baldwin,
1980; Karenga, 1993; Akbar, 1976,1991a; Nobles, 1991a, 1991b; Dixon, 1976; Fanon,
1963; King, 1976).
Upon identifying rational choice criteria as having a strictly Western
axiologicai orientation, neoclassical microeconomic agency is considered within a social
context as inconsistent with an African axiologicai orientation. While a comparative
evaluation of microeconomic agency under assumptions o f European and African
worldview specificity and within "modem" and traditional socioeconomic conditions
promises meaningful intellectual insights, such a task is beyond the objective scope of
this work and is not immediately useful to the development of its central hypothesis.
Moreover, as a converse approach, African-centered microeconomic agency within a
European social context, appears a problematic that pertains more to the
socioeconomic condition o f diasporic Africans and concerns itself more with the
validity o f Western ontology than the present focus requires.
It is argued that culturally inappropriate rational choice criteria supports a
form o f African microeconomic agency that evidences meta-axiological dilemma.
Meta-axiological dilemma is defined as the use of non-indigenous utilitarian modalities
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as a surface level behavior to support, sustain and reproduce African big-social
existence. This concept also encompasses the obverse, i.e., the satiation o f Western
social and material wants through traditional modalities. Different axiological sets
attached to behavioral expectations and the situational demand o f social organization
conflict in their manichean conjugation to the social objectives o f individual
microeconomic outcomes. The degree o f axiological proportionality within this
philosophical conjugation determines the strength o f functional dependence between
social and material objectives.

In addition, it determines the direction of

socioeconomic development as utility (use value) is predicated on axiological
orientation and necessarily influences the pattern of both consumptive and productive
modalities.
African underdevelopment is argued herein to be positively correlated the
extent to which rational choice criteria o f the neoclassical utility function conditions
inurement o f 18th century European axiology and produces meta-axiological dilemma
in African micro-behavioral performance.

And, inasmuch as culture's functional

association to social behavior yields a deterministic relationship that African social
psychological theory recognizes as having important epistemological significance for
the African personality construct, neoclassical microeconomic agency estranges the
African actor from traditional socioeconomic organization by reproducing "modem"
socioeconomic praxes that generate culturally unsupportive

outcomes. The
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reproduction of alien social axiology dissociates material from social development
only to isolate the former as the greater objective for consumptive modality.
Intertemporal processes o f African rationality are revealed to find their expression in
intergenerational poverty and indigence encouraged within permissible limits of
microeconomic agency by meta-axiological dilemma and sustained by decades o f
concessional foreign aid, industrialization and investment strategies, and structural
adjustment programs.
At a minimum, this approach intends specific consequences that suggest areas
for more parturient theoretical and empirical work on the involvement o f antipodal
self-concept and meta-axiological dilemma in African socioeconomic behavior. First, it
provides conceptual clarity to a heretofore ambiguous and unfocused critique of
ethnocentrism in neoclassical development theory.

Second, it places pedestrian

scholarly acknowledgments o f Western ethnocentrism squarely within intellectual
discourse on internecine social psychologies, thereby substantiating pertinent
questions about policy implementations o f racist development theories.

Third, it

suggests areas for more parturient theoretical and empirical work on the involvement
o f meta-axiological dilemma and antipodal self-concept in African socioeconomic
organization. And lastly, it justifies critical examinations o f the predictive and
evaluative efficiencies of the utility function.
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CHAPTER n

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter reviews the body o f literature within economic anthropology
which critiques the neoclassical microeconomic paradigm as predisposed in its
theoretical assumptions toward Western social organization and behavior.

Its

sociological orientation centers this literature on two main dimensions o f the historical
debate over economic detenninism and the functional nature o f economy as a social
institution. Broadly, it posits an inability to apprehend microeconomic behavior as
teleologically independent o f social relations and organization.

It questions, in

addition, the extent to which the neoclassical concept o f "economizing" as an
ecologically informed propensity appears a catholic hum an predilection.

With its

distinction by kind rather than degree o f non-western from western economic
modalities, this literature advances an argument for an inherent inability o f the
neoclassical approach to transcend its narrow methodological scope and consequently
yield accurate insights into the socioeconomic performance o f underdeveloped nonwestern societies.
In order to situate within the objective scope o f this dissertation a review of
this specific body o f literature with its inherent multiplicity o f analytical foci equally

16
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as numerous and varied as are reasons deduced from the neoclassical framework for
Africa’s difficulty to surmount economic stagnation and, in some cases, regression,
attention is confined topically to its singular treatment o f social organization as
rational choice determinants. This purposive focus is hardly suggestive of a similar
reduction o f the subtle complexities underlying related issues of reciprocity and
redistribution as a basis for social relations (Polanyi, 1968) or historical exam inations
o f market and pre-colonial modes o f production (e.g., Meillassoux, 1972; CoqueryVidrovitch, 1978), o f Marxian and neo-Marxian contributions to

economic

anthropology (e.g., Weber, 1984; Sahlins, 1972; Firth, 1975; Godelier, 1978 ) or more
technically involved considerations of price determination that risk preoccupation
with comparative efficiencies (e.g., Cook, 1969). Rather, the confinement to rational
choice and its social determinants serves to limit consideration o f this critical literature
to its examination of the ontological and axiological dimensions of microeconomic
assumptions that predicate and center the methodology o f neoclassical growth theory.
The neoclassical approach equates "economic" with "material", and implicit in
its behavioral assumptions are the beliefs that microeconomic agency concerns itself
with the provision o f material goods that satisfy unlimited biological and social wants;
and scarcity, as a condition of microeconomic agency, results from the insatiability o f
man's material wants. Scarcity can only obtain in those societies which place great
value on accumulation relative to more social and collective goal attainments, and
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whose institutional structure impels such a propensity. Thus within the neoclassical
purview, the individual contravenes society in a relationship o f exteriority, appearing
to be autonomous its effectuations as society itself becomes a collection o f means
toward material self-gain.
In her recapitulation o f the intellectual progression o f scholarship within
economic anthropology, Ortiz (1983) notes that underlying the neoclassical approach
is a concept of economy as an adaptive modality to ecological constraints that shape
the direction o f cultural effort and social organization (1983rviii). Its usefulness in
elucidating the problem o f underdevelopment came under scrutiny with Malinowski's
ethnographic study o f Trobriand Islanders and its attendant suggestion that economic
activity in underdeveloped areas requires consideration beyond their endemic
technologies (Malinowski, 1921). An emergent homeostatic view o f the relation
between man and environment raised concerns over the relationship between
technology and social need that fostered a more sociological orientation, one whose
focus on the social significance of technological change to social need lies
contradistinct the neoclassical conceptual focus on "economizing", i.e., problematic
rational choice allocations inherent conditions o f unlimited want satisfaction, scarcity
and uncertainty (Firth, 1975; Herskovits, 1952).
A clearer delineation of this core distinction is provided by Sahlins (1969) as a
central disagreement over the ambiguous meaning and ontological locus of economy,
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from which all other conceptual and methodological differences of method and
conception derive. In the neoclassical sense, economy is a generalized human activity
or behavioral propensity, rather than the cultural endeavor or sub-unit o f sociocultural
order that it is under the sociological approach. Because economic agency is
differentiated contextually, the action o f each economic subject unfolds on different
levels.

Under the neoclassical approach, economic action becomes a mode o f

rationality or sub-category within a general human behavioral repertoire.

The

sociological approach on the other hand signifies the cultural process through which
productive and consumptive allocations sustain social organization. Sahlins points
out that this essential disparity between inherent assumptions about natural
behavioral propensities and the influence o f social forces upon individual behavior
predicates the contrast between the "formalist" neoclassical and "substantivist"
sociological approaches to economic organization and activity.
In addition to Malinowski's earlier work, Herskovits (1952) provides one o f
the initial critiques o f the neoclassical method to emerge from what had been regarded
heretofore as economic sociology. Working within the neoclassical framework, he
concerns himself with understanding its inter-societal applications of the process o f
economizing, which he defines as a way o f conceptualizing and initiating economic
action amid scarcity imposed by expanding desires.

He asserts that basic needs

provisioning inevitably involves choice conditioned by alternative resource availability
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and cultural patterns which socialization engenders within the individual decision
maker. Thus, a "cultural matrix" frames the process o f economizing and affects
individual want and want-satiation. Herskovits maintains that the theoretical point o f
departure for neoclassical economizing as rational choice must of necessity be the
social individual constrained by resource availability and cultural axiology. Its method
comprises universals in the human experience that provide a basis for all
generalizations on the nature and functioning o f economic organization and the
achievement o f socially sanctioned economic objectives.
Most importantly for underdevelopment and the inter-societal applications o f
rational choice are Herskovits' implication o f cultural variation across societies and the
Durkheimian significance it ascribes to technology, divisions o f labor and capital as
universals in the human experience.

Ecological scarcity does constrain the

economizing process by limiting the range o f maximizible human want, presuming that
human want is inexhaustible. Rational choice narrows as a result, and non-literate,
underdeveloped societies become moored to simple economies that satisfy only the
most basic biological needs. The degree o f sophistication for economic rationality
appears ecologically or materially determined, as do axiology and ontology as its
cultural antecedents.

Consequently, for Herskovits, the neoclassical approach to

economic organization is not geared to consider those societies wherein resource
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alternatives are so severely arrested as to narrow the margin between utility and
disutility.
Indisputably, the body o f theoretical work submitted by Karl Polanyi (1957,
1968) and elaborated upon by his former student, George Dalton (1961, 1968, 1969,
1971), offers the fullest examination o f the limitations o f the neoclassical analytical
scope.

Polanyi further develops Herskovits' contentions that cultural variation

configures rational choice through affective socialization, and the range o f human
wants is circumscribed quantitatively by scarcity and qualitatively by culture. He
similarly distinguishes economic behavior from economy as mutually interdependent
yet discrete social phenomena confused by neoclassical assumptions that generalize
relative human motivations and behavioral propensities.

The nature of individual

behavioral impetus and the collective productive patterns that result as necessary
social outcomes predicate not only this distinction but one central to Polanyi's
critique o f economizing as an abstracted economic process and rational choice as a
concrete form typified by market social organization.
Polanyi regards economic agency as the essence o f rationality in much the
same fashion as Herskovits.

Both theorists concur that economizing is the

disposition of time and energy in order to maximize subsistence goals in an unyielding
environment o f scarcity.

But Polanyi rejects the neoclassical notion of a

particularized rationality

complementing an equally particularized mode o f
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subsistence provisioning. The neoclassical approach may indeed evidence selective
consideration o f sociological factors on the dynamic operation o f an economy. But its
essential core o f utilitarian rationality remains unaffected.

For Polanyi, the

relationship between the economy and economic agency is such that the institutional
structure of the former compels the latter. Thus, where the neoclassical approach
fails is in its non-integration o f abstracted, sociologically grounded human wants with
their satiation through generalized, socially prescribed productive modalities. In an
essay on the social location o f economy, Polanyi argues that the process through
which material want-satisfaction occurs serves as the point o f common interest
throughout the history o f economies. Locating and analyzing this process however,
which the neoclassical approach fails to do, can only be achieved by emphasizing a
generalized configuration associating subsistence provisioning to a mode o f agency
rather than to a specific type of rationality.
Dalton (1961, 1968, 1969, 1971) later substantiates Polanyi’s assertion by
noting that central to the failure of neoclassical theory is its exclusive emphasis on
industrial capitalism as the most highly evolved form of social organization.
Nevertheless, non-western economies do provide useful insights into those aspects of
industrial society that directly pertain to the development o f welfare and communistic
state economies. Polanyi, he argues, as a central theorist in economic anthropology
attempts to elucidate the societal divisiveness of capitalist economies and its
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inevitable requirement o f social control.

A clear disjunction between otherwise

teleological social relations and economic behavior conditions the inevitability o f
divisiveness and requisite social control. Dalton points out that Polanyi's analytical
focus on institutional processes underlies Tonnies' point that archaic, non literate
societies are gemeinschaft rather than gesellschaft (1968xiii).

Moreover, his

perspective lies contradistinct Marx's earlier analysis o f social dichotomies within
capitalist organization inasmuch as the latter only presumes some measure of
congruity between axiology and praxis that renders collective social objectives
heterogeneous, however potential and unrealized they may be for labor.
Focusing on the residual physiocratic underpinnings o f formal economic
theory, Dalton further specifies Polanyi's critique by arguing that combined
neoclassical conditions o f human insatiability and scarcity are not only fundamentally
incorrect as universal principles, but confuse a biologically sound assumption with a
specific social orientation (Dalton, 1961). He maintains that in seeking to explicate
price determinations o f rational choice in allocative, productive and consumptive
modalities, the neoclassical approach treats economy as natural and divine in its
superintendence by market dynamics. This nominalist position accords Western
social organization a catholicity presumably deducible as an inevitability from a
conjectured refinement o f human evolution on the assumption o f a sovereign ubiquity
o f physical scarcity (cum "accessibility"), an autonomy from social factors, and a
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ligation o f the noumenal and phenomenal through a human link between selfpreservation and material acquisition. At their root these assumptions necessarily
imply a dual human behavioral characteristic under the neoclassical approach that is a
tautological identity, not an interdependent inequality.4 Biologically, man’s very
existence is insatiable, requiring continuous material sustenance.

Socially, and of

biological necessity, man values and pursues more material acquisition (aim :
"consumption") to less.
Dalton asserts that if the human being is to fulfill material wants and desires,
and s/he economizes to do so, then material acquisition must be a socially determined
value whose institutional structure impels society to behave accordingly. Thus by
acknowledging "bio-social existence", an approach to economic organization must
explain the socio-organizational requirements, rights and obligations that both
integrates and preferentially orders resources and productive techniques for the
continuous provisioning o f material livelihood. This collection o f normative rules
more precisely distinguishes an "economic system". Even under the adumbration of
the neoclassical framework, social convention determines social organization by
informing its utilitarian foundations o f rational choice economizing to the extent that
the axiological significance o f material acquisition is ranked ordinally higher than
alternative objective attainments.

Institutionally, social organization must both

4 Mathematically, a tautological “identity” and an interdependent “inequality”.
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support and propagate this ordinal valuation as summum bonum, or the supreme
social good.
For both Polanyi and Dalton, it is precisely because the neoclassical approach
erroneously accords universality and a Darwinian sovereignty to a particular
ontologically

and axiologically closed set that

its

resultant

analyses

of

underdevelopment are both prescriptively empty and methodologically inapplicable
to underdeveloped societies. The very basis o f utilitarian rationality wields significant
implications for various definitive characteristics o f underdevelopment (see Rostow,
1960; Leibenstein, 1957; Baran, 1961), as well as ascriptive Lamarckian notions of
comparative degrees o f human evolution and civilization.
That strictly Western social reality grounds the neoclassical approach to
development is hardly a novel hypothesis. Economics, the argument postulates, is
eurocentric in its behavioral assumptions and use of principles relative to a Western
predisposition toward market organization and atomistic capital accumulation.
Unfortunately, however, the argument ends here, thereby rendering insufficient its
simple observation and acknowledgment o f inconsistency between methodological
principles emphasizing observation o f social life and analysis o f expectations under
different circumstances without drawing inferences that result in scientific, objective
political precepts (Myrdal, 1954). The same holds equally true for attempts to
explicate probable methodological problems of objectification while that portion of
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reality Western paradigms presumably model persists to reproduce transculturally
Western social reality (Weber, 1984; Akbar 1985a).
It should perhaps be mentioned that the neoclassical approach would not
necessarily disagree w ith the economic anthropological critique of formal
microeconomic analysis, its market orientation, or its conceptualization o f scarcity
and material want satisfaction.5 Both approaches exhibit an ontological congruity in
their perception o f ecological constraints on the human being that define his/her
relationship to the natural environment Each, in addition, similarly recognizes that
poorly developed institutions cum infrastructure, absent a foundation supportive of
"modem" socioeconomic growth, cannot accommodate the normative behavioral
expectations implicit in the neoclassical paradigm that prelimit rationality.

But

beyond these mutual concurrences, these approaches diverge on the issue o f how
man's relationship to his natural environment affects individual behavior and the

5 Or, institutional economics for that matter. Keller, etal. (1982) note institutional
economics’ concern with change and the process of change in community values, its
recognition o f the endogenous role o f social values in shaping economic preferences
and tastes, and its regard for economic policies consistent with such normative
principl as equality, individual dignity and self-actualization, democracy and
“honesty”. Tool has similarly criticized the neoclassicals’ use o f utility as a criterion
o f judgment for being tautological, relativistic and inapplicable (Tool, 1980:313).
While the institutionalist perspective does provide some useful insights into social
value theory, its institution-specific, policy-oriented, and therefore decidedly
macrosociological focus fails consistently to treat the character, origin and
consequence o f culture, and the impact of these dimemsions o f culture on habituated
patems of social interaction and relations. Institutional economics assumes the
catholicity of Western cultural abstractions (e.g., “honesty”, democracy, equality).
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causal direction that ontology obliges this effectuation to follow; that is, whether the
ontology is characteristically nominalist or realist in scope. The significance o f the
economic anthropological position redounds to its acknowledgment and acceptance o f
non-westem rational choice modalities.

It fails however to provide a cogent

explanation for an institutional ethnocentrism that accounts for western cultural
determinations

of

counterproductive

socioeconomic

outcomes,

being

too

epistemologically narrow and conceptually redefining that its task o f overcoming the
neoclassical problem o f ethnocentrism warrants. The inability o f poorly developed
social organization to produce rational socioeconomic outcomes must necessarily
present itself as a question o f the applicability o f neoclassical micro-behavioral
assumptions to non-westem societies. Thus, the economic anthropological discourse
requires a broader theoretical scope that more acutely attends to the influence o f
western ethnocentrism on non-westem socioeconomic development, and which allows
a fuller consideration of the implications for the predictive efficiency o f
microeconomic agency subject to culturally consonant, non-westem conditions of
social organization.

It simply wants o f thought beyond both the solipsistic

parameters of the neoclassical approach and its own parochial observations.
In sum, the critical discourse o f economic anthropology reconceptualizes
microeconomic agency as a cultural process of definite teleological (functional)
patterns o f interaction possessing historical and geographic relevance. It maintains

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that insatiability is a cultural rather than natural human propensity, and that scarcity
is, ipso facto, sociological, empirical and relative, not axiomatic and ubiquitous. A
dual meaning o f the concept "economic" is perceived to be at the root o f neoclassical
assumptions about scarcity and the pervasiveness o f microeconomic agency.
Biological man/woman requires continuous material sustenance while sociological
man/woman wants more to less material goods.

Because the human being

"economizes" to satisfy material wants, material acquisition must be a socially
determined value whose institutionalization compels society toward conformity with
normative micro-behavioral expectations.

All societies possess the common

propensity to sustain "bio-social" existence through socially sanctioned allocative
modalities (e.g., market, reciprocal, redistributive). And while valid inter-societal or
transcultural analysis can only concern itself with their institutionalization, the
economy appropriate to each appertains to a culturally determined logic, method,
strategy or mode o f rationality unique to circumstantial evaluations o f bio-social
existence.
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CHAPTER HI

ON CULTURE

This chapter briefly reviews a sociological perspective o f culture. A more
cybernetic model o f culture is introduced which further elucidates the Polanyists'
omission o f relevant cultural factors.

Moreover, the cybernetic model o f culture

provides an analytical framework from which to consider the neoclassical paradigm as
a cultural model of reality. The spatial-temporal simultaneity o f disparate axiological
sets which the imposition o f colonialism firmly established is argued to condition the
meta-axiological dilemma o f pursuing culturally consonant economic outcomes from
an alien model o f reality.

Sociological View o f Culture

Broadly defined, culture encompasses the learned values, norms, knowledge,
artifacts, language and symbols that are constantly communicated among aggregates o f
people who share a common way o f life. For sociologist Howard Becker (1986),
culture has more o f a praxeological focus as shared understandings that people use to
coordinate their activities. Benton (1982) conceptualizes culture ontologically as a
system of symbols and meanings, including knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs, and

29
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any other capabilities and habits acquired as a member o f society. It is the learned
repertoire of every transmissible thought and action. Benton contends that culture is
not additive, but integral to the formation and development o f the human being. Since
instincts do not organize, mind and body, themselves incapable o f directing human
behavior or organizing human experiences, evolve within the framework o f culture.
Williams (1982) says that the meaning o f culture ranges from an emphasis on a
noumenal "spirit" informing distinct ways of life, to distinctively discernible social
processes. The sense o f culture as the active cultivation o f the mind similarly ranges
from a "developed" state of mind, to processes of intellectual development and the
means o f such processes (e.g., the arts). For Williams, the current notion o f culture
references means o f intellectual development that are contradistinct its anthropological
and extended sociological interpretations as a total way o f life.

Presumably, this

contemporary understanding o f culture results from the convergence o f an eighteenth
century philosophical focus on "informing spirit" that is most apparent in specific
cultural activities (e.g., rituals), and a later nineteenth century behavioralist focus on a
total social order consisting primarily o f integrated social activities.

Williams

designates these pre-convergence perspectives on culture as idealist and materialist
respectively.6 The method of each perspective differs only inasmuch as there are

6 Griswold (1994) makes the distinction between a humanities viewpoint that
privileges an opposition between culture and civilization, and a functionalism that
emphasizes more of a harmony between culture and civilization.
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socially corroborating distinctions between culture as worldview and culture as the
formation, organization and production o f signifying systems.
The idealist perspective identifies an informing spirit as central to the interests
and values of a social group as they are manifest in institutions and activities.
Williams asserts that the idealist perspective must extend and qualify its position to
avoid a historical repetition of culture's development and spurious validation o f
culture as a total way o f life. The notion of culture cannot be abstracted as an
informing spirit at the root o f cultural production.

He argues that such an

interpretation reduces cultural praxis to mere ideology by ignoring the dynamic,
complex processes o f tension and conflict, resolution and irresolution, innovation and
change through which culture is produced. A broadening o f the idealist perspective
must include, o f necessity, the distinctive feelings, attitudes and assumptions
important to tracing the changing culture o f continuing or persistent social groupings.
In addition, Williams maintains that the idealist perspective must further consider
manifest cultural productions that are not directly expressive o f formal and conscious
beliefs (e.g., drama, fiction, painting).
Contrastly, the materialist perspective incorporates specific forms o f the
known or discoverable character o f the general social order.

Its more extensive

purview subsumes the idealist emphasis on constitutive cultural practices by
characterizing culture as a signifying system that communicates and reproduces social
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order. Cultural praxis and production cease to appear as merely derivative o f a
constituted social order, but as factors significant to its constitution.

Williams

observes that considering the materialist perspective as not incorporating the idealist
one is perhaps more precise since both do acknowledge a superintendent social order.
The materialist perspective privileges anthropomorphism to account for a more
biological propagation o f social order. In fact, it is Benton who observes that it is the
responsibility o f culture to impose order. Without it, human behavior becomes an
ungovernable "chaos o f pointless acts and exploding emotions" (1982:463). He points
out further th a t" [i]t is by and through symbolic models that hum ans are able to come
to terms with their environment, that they come to understand it, to see it, to
interpret it" (1982:464).
Consequently, as a matter o f practicality, social man is estranged from his
cosmological foundations in order to conflate ontology and its symbolization,
encoding through a range o f institutionalized social behaviors: from language to
journalism, fashion and advertising.

Williams notes that although the idealist

perspective is contrasted against the material as a false consciousness or illusionary
experience, it nevertheless is identical to the common experience that empirical
sociology alleges to observe. Their similarity —that an a priori explanatory method or
logic governs social experience and cultural production —is itself a fact o f a particular
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developmental phase of culture, and their difference lies in their possession of
distinctively diametrical philosophical bases.

Culture as a Scientific Construct

The treatment o f culture within a proactive Fanonian tradition centers on
theoretical and empirical research on the structure, functioning and implications of
African-centered cognitive modalities, personalities constructs and worldview within
socially oppressive environments (Azibo, 1991; Baldwin, 1980; Akbar, 1976, 1991a;
Nobles, 1976, 1991a, 1991b; Dixon, 1976; Fanon, 1963, 1967; King, 1976). This
tradition, elements o f which are found in the work o f Frantz Fanon, posits a social
psychological association between several layers o f culture that produces a dynamic
cybernetic process that subsumes Williams' comparatively static typology under
three interactive levels: primary, secondary or "intermediate", and surface levels o f
culture. Hereupon, culture becomes a scientific construct characterized as "a process
which gives a people a general design for living and patterns for interpreting reality"
(Azibo, 1991). This more process-oriented framework clarifies Williams' idealist
emphasis o f culture as an epistemological pattern for interpreting reality that
originates in the primary and secondary levels o f culture.
Various constituent elements interact at each level of culture to provide for a
functional order within the overall interpretive design. Cosmology and ontology
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structure the axiological orientation o f social behavior and interaction at the primary
level.

Cosmology, distinguished herein horn its confused popular usage as

"worldview", refers to a philosophical conceptualization that models a systematic
understanding o f the origin, structure and processes o f the universe.

The self

conceptualizations that form in response to this conceptual system which confers a
sense o f human purpose and direction, with its attendant set o f social psychological
personality constructs, structures ontology.

These two primary level factors

structure in tandem the formation of value sets from which emerges a general design
for living and interpretive pattern that "models" a conceptual universe, and that
governs surface level social behavior and social interaction.

This primary level

activity predicates secondary level formation of worldview or "ethos", and ideology.
Combined, the primary and secondary levels comprise what Nobles' refers to as "deep
structure. Deep structure organizes the scope and nature o f the surface level of
culture, which is constituted by a vast array of overtly expressed, manifest behaviors
and practices, inclusive but not limited to symbols, language and customs. Formed of
these primary and secondary levels, the objective functioning o f culture's deep
structure is to organize or "model" a conceptual universe for the members o f a society.
Nobles, as do Benton and Williams, notes a tendency in human society to
construct symbolic models that function both as worldview-specific paradigms o f
reality that harbor a metaphysical acceptance of actuality, and ethos-specific
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paradigms fo r reality that prescribe moral or evaluative standards for living.
Accordingly, the surface level o f culture becomes a collection o f observable material
objects and behavioral repertoires that signify deep structural philosophical cum
metaphysical orientations and social values. Surface level activity then corresponds
to Williams' materialist emphasis on signifying systems that communicate and
reproduce a social order whose construct and internal validities rests within cultural
deep structure.
Essentially, culture models a process of human development through an
idiosyncratic interpretive framework. Myriad forms o f observable social interaction
and the institutionalized clusters o f recurrent social patterns o f behavior combine to
constitute this process o f human development, while concomitantly communicating,
reinforcing and propagating the foundations o f culture. Socialization, as a process of
enculturation that is dynamic, multidimensional and participatory, presumes to
evolve, develop and sustain the individual member o f society into a particularized
conceptualization of human being that defines the nature of m an's association with his
environment and, consequently, the scope o f his relationship with himself and with
others. These defining assumptions about the nature and scope o f hum an being form
respectively the cosmological, ontological and axiological underpinnings o f culture.
The implication o f the Nobles' model of culture for neoclassical microeconomic
agency is a further elaboration of the Polanyist critique of its rational choice

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

assumptions. It widens the conceptual scope o f the Polanyi Group's contrastly static
claim that embedded within non-westem economic behaviors as surface level praxes
are distinctively non-westem social relations.

Moreover, it suggests that the

post-colonial incidence o f conspicuously dissimilar social praxes typically demarcated
along lines o f "traditional" and "modem", or "rural" and "urban", reveal differences in
axiological sets grounded in the cultural deep structure of two disparate cultures.
Their spatial and temporal contiguity, veiled by the debate between Polanyists' and
Formalists over the dual meaning o f economy, persists as residuals to African colonial
heritage. Inasmuch as the Polanyists recognize this spatial-temporal contiquity as
modes of economizing, they overlook its deep structural significance as antipodal
axiological sets governing the scope and nature of surface level economic behaviors.
By elucidating the existence o f necessary and sufficient cosmological and
ontological antecedents to rational choice assumptions, the Nobles model renders the
neoclassical paradigm of economic behavior significantly more than merely descriptive
o f some universally experienced economic reality. The neoclassical microeconomic
paradigm becomes a cultural paradigm that models a European-centered method for
how to live by providing (a) a cosmological assumption about the natural
environment; (b) several ontological assumptions that prescribe the scope and nature
o f human predisposition; and (c) a derivative axiological postulate that serves as
objective motive for social behavior.
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CHAPTER IV

THE CALCULUS OF RATIONAL CHOICE

This chapter presents the rational choice criteria that underlie the neoclassical
microeconomic paradigm.

As the mathematical representation o f microeconomic

agency, the utility function encodes six axioms of choice, two o f which evidence
Western deep structural bias. The axioms of nonsatiation and convexity are identified
as a primary level assumptions about human nature and the relationship between man
and his environment within an axiologically closed set o f cultural values. These
assumptions tender the neoclassical paradigm o f economic agency culturally relative
to a Eurocentric mode o f socioeconomic organization.

As a consequence, the

paradigm models a non-African interpretation of reality; one that imposes a normative
index or typology o f human worth.

Micro-behavioral Determinants o f Growth

As the "dominant method o f growth economics" (Jones,

1976), the

neoclassical paradigm understands capitalism to be a system based on an assumed
ability to rationally choose among competitive alternatives and an equally assumed
ability and willingness to adapt and innovate; all in response to mutable market
37
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conditions and in pursuit o f wealth accumulation. Wealth is equated to gross national
or domestic product; its level, rate of growth and per capital allocation are presumed
indicative of accumulation. Presupposing characteristics o f “backwardness” and a
general state of undevelopedness (Rostow, 1960; Leibenstein, 1957; Rodney, 1972),
cyclical poverty (Nurkse, 1955), and apriori notions that impute such qualities to
imperfect behavior in otherwise naturally equilibriating markets, development is
regarded as a process that promotes maximization o f output (production) and
allocative efficiencies once blockages are extirpated. Perfect competition is implicit
development; "under"- development is understood as a "special" or exceptional case.
Analysis and modeling o f development centers around four key variables, their
functional relationships and attendant assumptions: production (Y), capital (K), labor
(L) and savings (S). The gross national/domestic product (GNP/GDP) approach as an
income-based measure of productivity and, in its per capita form, distribution,
provides a proxy for wealth that insufficiently indicates well-documented and
controversial tradeoffs between growth, distribution and equity (Streeten, 1979;
Ahluwalia, 1976; Kuznets 1955).

Consequent indices of identified "basic needs"

supplemented GNP/GDP measures toward the end of the seventies and afforded
gauging or, in the very least, refocussing attention upon redistribution and translating
real income into measures o f social production. This widening o f the key variables
proceeded refinement of the Harrod-Domar model of the rate o f growth o f output to
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incorporate a variable capital-labor ratio over time, as well as to allow for factor
substitution and adjustment through pliable returns to scale and perfect factor
markets. These improvements resolved Harrod's concern over an intrinsic instability
o f the warranted growth rate due to investment and its propensity to diverge from the
natural rate. Apart from this theoretical fine-tuning, his basic functional relationship
between the key variables remains the foundation for planning and analysis of
approaches to industrialization and the macro-management o f development
interventions.
The notion of demand causally predicates the key variables o f the growth
model.

And whether implicit theories of national income distribution between

consumption and investment, wages and profits, or policy-oriented structural
adjustment strategies, demand affects macro-level market activity and patterns
movement in these primary growth indices. Thus, it is entirely appropriate to
specify the micro-level utility function as that unit of analysis determining the role of
demand in macro-level economic processes through its mathematical encoding of
behavioral assumptions.

This treatment o f the utility function follows a more

sociologically specified understanding o f economy as a societal institution possessing
teleological properties o f legitimation, propagation and rejuvenation, as well as the
endogenous properties o f a recurrent pattern o f social interaction that is oriented
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toward human sustenance as a basic social need. It is this understanding o f economy
that demystifies macroeconomic processes, regards development as mere outcomes of
purposive sociocultural behaviors and interactions, and associates underdevelopment
with the incidence o f anomie between culture and social behaviors.

Neoclassical Microeconomic Agency

The neoclassical perspective identifies microeconomics as the analysis o f the
economic behavior o f the individual units that comprise an economic system. Like
any branch o f the social sciences, microeconomics attempts to explain and predict
observed human phenomena regardless o f whether such explanations or predictions
have any immediate application to practical problems.

It is concerned with the

relationships that exist between each unit o f analysis: prices and the demand and
supply o f goods and services.
Several

key

concepts

are

crucial

to

neoclassical

microeconomics.

Microeconomic "agency" is defined as a pattern o f social behavior which allocates
"scarce" resources among alternative uses to satisfy human wants. Choice is assumed
to govern this atomistic propensity, and is itself governed by specific assumptions
about the motivations for economic behaviors, viz., (a) people act in their own self-
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interest, and (b) people prefer more to less.

Both assumptions assist in making

predictions about the outcomes o f economic problems. Microeconomic agents are
regarded as "rational" when their behaviors are informed by these assumptions.
The larger macroeconomic system in which microeconomic agency occurs is
defined by "what it does" rather than by the seemingly more logical "what it is". An
economic system must allocate resources among competing uses, combine and process
those resources to produce goods and services for human want, determine the
amounts o f goods and services to be produced, distribute those goods and services
among society's members, and, determine provisions to be made for the future growth
o f the society's accumulated wealth.

An economic system is assisted in the

performance o f its functions by a price mechanism. Problems unique to the proper
functioning o f an economic system are predicated upon questions o f efficiency, i.e.,
price efficiency, technical or productive efficiency, income distribution and growth.
Resources, being defined by the concepts o f scarcity and ownership, produce
the goods and services used to satisfy human wants. They are scarce because their
supply is limited in the face o f unlimited wants for goods and services.

Scarce

resources are economic because they command a price7, while non-economic resources
are free, readily available and unable to be claimed as individual property. Ownership

7 i.e., an exchange value.
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of resources constraints their supply through property rights.

Owned resources

(land, labor, capital) having alternative uses8 command an opportunity cost for their
use (rent, wages and interest) which constitutes their respective prices. The market
price for a scarce, owned resource further depends on how the resource is utilized.
Human wants are psychological occurrences that goods and services satisfy.
As psychological occurrences, human want is spawned by physiological factors (e.g.,
food, clothing and shelter) and influenced by cultural factors that affect tastes and
preferences for goods and services. Needs is not a concept generally considered by
economists since they are regarded as normative rather than positive and, hence,
exogenous formal logic processes. There exists no objective method for determining
allocation on the basis o f needs; wants are readily observable and measurable, and are
referred to as "demand" to reflect how much consumers are willing to pay for the
goods and services they want. Obversely, observable and measurable satiation of
human wants is referred to as "supply".
Market demand is the aggregate desire for a specific good or service as
represented by summed individual demand curves generated by plotting individual
demand schedules. Whether for market or individual demand, demand schedules are
simply tables that show the quantities demanded o f a specific good or service at
various prices. Individual demand curves and, ultimately, market demand curves are
functionally dependent upon relative prices, the prices of related goods and services,

8 i.e., alternative use value.
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the number o f consumers in the market, incomes, and preferences. Mathematically,
an individual demand curve is symbolized by the equation: Qd = /(p , r, n, y ,t), where
Qd

= quantity demanded, p = relative prices, r = prices o f related goods, n = number

o f consumers, y = income, t = tastes and preferences
The demand curve represents the relationship between the dependent variable,
Qd,

or quantity demanded, and the independent variable, p, or relative price. The

remaining independent variables (i.e., number o f consumers, prices o f related goods,
number o f consumers in the market, the consumer’s income, and tastes and
preferences) are held constant and considered exogenous to the model of
microeconomic behavior.9 Changes in each independent variable affects the position
and shape o f the graphed demand curve.

The Calculus o f Utility

Topically restricted to microeconomic agency, utility is normally regarded as
synonymous to the satisfaction o f human wants through the consumption o f goods or
services. Conceptually, it evolved from a normative postulate about human behavior
to a theory o f social value reconciling behavioral assumptions deduced from this "first
principle" to the demand for scientific rigor. And while an expediency is involved

9 It is important to note a growing scholarly interet in the theoretical impact o f
variable tastes and preferences on quantity demanded (Qd). This contemporary field
o f inquiry has been referred to as quasi-rational economics. See Thaler (1994).
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utility's connotative shift, the validity o f its contemporary understanding is
considered, if at all, to be accident its evolutionary root in the development of
jurisprudence and political theory yet firmly entrenched in its mathematical
expression.
It was Aristotle who provided post-medieval, preindustrial Europe the
framework with which to preface its inquiry o f economic behavior's moral
underpinnings with discussions o f the nature of microeconomic agency, its societal
implications and significance. While Aristotle's observations were later mooted as
pedestrian, slightly mediocre and irrelevant by the less than reflective, his borrowed
"Doctrine of the Mean" furnished Bentham and the later marginalists with a typology
and evaluative framework with which to contemplate the substance o f political
economy. For Aristotle behavior is morally assessable, hence "rational" behavior
orients toward some desired end or "good" restricted to the soul cum mind. Assuming
that man serves a natural function, happiness — perfect and self-sufficient — is
revealed to be the highest virtue o f the soul, its summum bonum.

Virtue, as an

attribute o f the soul, concerns action and feeling mediated by pleasure and pain. It is a
disposition toward an equilibrium o f action and feeling. Happiness predicates itself in
consequence upon activities balanced o f action and feeling, and thereby consistent
with virtue. Pleasure and pain, neither being virtue or objective happiness, and wealth
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as an objective presumed o f economic agency, serve only as parameters to obtaining
an end in accumulated want satisfaction.
Upon this, a difficulty as confusing as it is protracted attaches itself to
understanding Bentham's association o f wealth as an objective end with "rational"
parametric dispositions toward pleasure and pain: a specification wholly inconsistent
with Aristotle's more abstract behavioral objective which later emerges fully armored
from physiocratic notions inextricably bound to a model o f natural law which
Bentham presumed burned into the soul o f men and revealed through a system o f pure
logic.
Utility as satisfaction is, prima facie, empirically indetenninant and incapable
of cardinal measurement It can however be ordered or ranked in accordance with a set
o f assumptions about how want satisfaction is obtained through economic choice.
Economic choices that conform to this set o f assumptions, commonly referred to as
axioms o f choice, evidence microeconomic agency that is both "rational" and capable
o f mathematical encoding. These six assumptions about how human want is satisfied
hew out a hyperbolic mathematical association between ordinal utility and
commodoties presumed existentially independent satisfaction o f human wants, yet
quantitatively corresponsive some fixed magnitude o f satisfaction. The quality of
ordinality is dependent upon nominal degrees o f satisfaction derived from an
equilibrium between use and exchange values. Projecting these equilevel, nonlinear
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associations onto a two dimensional space yields contours conmmonly referred to as
an indifference map.

Thus, the axioms o f reflexivity, completeness, transitivity,

continuity, nonsatiation and convexity facilitate a one-to-one mapping o f bundles o f
commodities (Qd) to utility.
The axiom of reflexivity posits logical equivalency through tautological
material equivalence: for any bundle o f commodities q, q = q. Each bundle is as
satisfying in utility as itself —an insignificant mathematical necessity once choice is
properly defined (Deaton, 1980:26).

With comparative indifference being as

important as tautological indifference, the axiom of completeness posits material
equivalence between two quantitatively disparate, qualitatively equal bundles q t and
q2 consonant a fixed level o f utility such that mutually exclusive indifference exists
between them.

Transitivity exports indifference across qualitatively equivalent

bundles via hypothetical syllogism: if qi = qz, and q2 = q3 , then qi = q 3 . This three
axiom consecution constructs an inchoate basis for preference orderings.

It is

important to note that the utility function’s existence was presumed at the outset; its
empirical grounding requiring one remaining stage of manifestation.
This prototype utility function cannot represent all preference orderings
without

assigned

magnitudes

facilitating

indifference

comparisons

across

quantitatively divergent commodity bundles and a smooth and differentiable
connective surface between them. Preferences can be discontinuous and reasonable, as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

is the case in lexicographic ordering (Deaton, 1980:27).

The fourth axiom, in

conjunction with some degree o f expediency, opportunes pretention and continuity
upon introduction o f closed sets: for any bundle q’, define A(q’) the “at least as good
as q’ set” and B(q’) the “no better than q’ set, by A(q’) = {q/q > q’}, B(q’) = {q/q’ >
q} (Deaton, 1980:127-128). Simply put, q’ = A(q’) = B(q’), or A and B are sets o f
quantitatively different bundles q such that each is at least as good or no better than q’
in human satisfaction (utility).
Hereupon, preference orderings are said to be adequately represented by a
utility function and capable of analysis using conventional mathematical techniques o f
optimization by means o f a fifth axiom o f nonsatiation: the utility function is non
decreasing in each o f its arguments and for all q in the choice set is increasing in at
least one o f its arguments (Deaton, 1980:128). This axiom establishes increasing
monotonicity, further defining the utility function up to a monotone increasing
transformation or by ordinality. The final axiom o f choice, convexity, implicates the
function’s quasi-concavity by defining indifference curves as convex to the origin: if
qi

3

q0, then for 0 < z < 1, zqi + (l-z)q0 > q0. Any combination o f commodities

within the domain of the function and restricted to a particular level o f utility is
preferred and substitutable within the restriction.
Mathematical representation of microeconomic agency predicates itself, for
the nonce, upon these six axioms about the nature o f the association between utility as
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human want and commodities as material want-satisfaction. Further restrictions on
this functional relationship proscribe certain possible behavioral tendencies (e.g., the
domain o f the opportunity set, the absence o f comer solutions, first-order conditions,
ecetera) but only subsequent to the function’s construction. With satisfaction now
ordinally measured, and the utility obtained being functionally dependent the
quantities o f goods and services demanded, to wit:
tf= /(q i.q * ~ .q n )

microeconomic agency can be symbolized by a mathematical function that is:
1. smooth and continuous (i.e.. twice differentiable).

U= / ( qb q2>, such that.

au = /,

au = / 2

8qi

dqz

in

=/n

3qi2
2.

afu

~ f 22

dq2 2

monotonically increasing.

The function is defined up to a monotone

increasing transformation:
if:

pqi > q 2, and pq2 > q2

then:

Ux = / ( Pqi, Pqz) > U2 = /(q i, q2 )

where: Ux = P/(q,, cfr)
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UX=$ U2

on

Thus, utility functions are homogeneous o f degree one.
3. ordinal. Monotone increasing transformations o f a utility function rank
higher in utility:
if-

U\ = /(P q i, Pqi) > Uz = /(q If

then: U\ > U2
and:
4.

Ut ranks higher in utility and consumer preferences.

quasi-concave.

The slope o f the utility function is increasing at a

decreasing rate:
3U > 0, and fidqi + / 2dq2 > 0
> 0, and f xidqi2+ 2f l2 9q! 9q2+f n d<k2> 0
as depicted in Figure 1.

On Reifying “Quality”
Mathematical treatment of what was otherwise considered a branch of
moral science is imputed to the early neoclassicals’ concern with notions of
wealth, utility, value, demand, supply, capital, interest, labor, and all other
quantitative notions belonging to the daily operations of industry and subject to
continuous variation. Jevons acknowledged doubt over quantifying satisfaction yet
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Figure I. The Neoclassical Utility Function and Indifference Curves.
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accommodated this proxy to facilitate comparisons, however imprecise the
congruence between reality and scientific abstraction is rendered as a result But what
o f the implications o f Jevons' doubt for the constructed utility function and ultimately
for rational choice criteria superintending microeconomic agency? It would appear an
unresolved methodological dichotomy not so much between ordinal and cardinal
measures as it is between quality and quantity.
On mathematics, two essential perspectives prevail. The first (Frege-Russell)
maintains a basis in formal cum symbolic logic; the second (Heyting) is proposition
free, experientially autonomous but dependent intuition (Runes, 1979:189-191). Both
characterize mathematics by method rather than subject or purpose. It is a method of
formal logic which abstracts sets o f characteristic piths into corporeality, serving
thereby as a reifying process so long as its noumenal subject remains existentially
unimportant and its objective form is merely presumed to approximate its tangible
existence. What emerges then is a technique applicable to a domain (set) o f unproved
essences (axioms), a range (set) o f undefined essences (objects), and the task of
reckoning their elements through an associative mapping of one to the other.
A function is a functional type o f associative mapping of domain onto its
image, or range (James, 1976:161-162).

Quantity, not quality, characterizes its

associative property, as does a state o f monotonic equivalence between argument and
value (Alcian, 1953). This relationship exists independent the function itself —which
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merely reifies the relationship's noumenal existence. It would appear that doubt over
whether the mapping can be performed is unfounded as any association implies logical
equivalence, by definition, between specified sets.

That its veracity may impel

inquiry proves the more relevant concern upon considering this association's
independence from its functional form, its ensconcing quality and quantity, its
objectification o f quality, and the nonaffectuation o f quantity (i.e., a seven or eleven
cannot be physically experienced). Therefore, with association being independent
functional form, quantity and quality may be mapped into determinancy by scientific
empiricism and its call for quantification —a call to overdeterminancy heralding the
birth o f noumena into phenomenal form.
The implication for microeconomic agency is a curious distinction implicit in
how the utility function is understood; one which estranges want from need. Both,
being quite psychological, are noumenal and as such are beyond mathematical
representation. The neoclassical approach posits that need is non-positive and nonempirical by nature, which causes it to be unsuitable for economic analysis since no
objective method exists to attend its determination.

On the contrary, however,

commodities do objectify human wants, rendering them readily observable,
measurable and determinate resource allocation.

This distinction made between

essentially identical motivations appears so in order to respect mathematical modeling
o f primary elements abstracted from reality, when in fact the reification required to
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provide resource allocation with a basis for determination accommodates either
noumenon.

Rather than be an issue o f accommodation, the distinction is more

relevant the strictly psychological origin o f want. Need is want, but want —nonpurposive, highly protean and timeless — is not necessarily need. The caprice want
connotes imbues consumption, production, and the wealth o f nations with
far-reaching implications. This ascription o f the range to an open interval or open set
of unlimited wants amounts to little more than predetermination, whether viewed
relative to mathematics as technique or to desirable functions o f the utility function
once quantity is mapped into quality.

Animism as an Example

Descriptions o f animism as an unrefined religious form exemplifies this
reification and subsequent estrangement o f the association o f want and material
satisfaction from its functional form through restricted sets. Prior to understanding its
intricate theological complexities, animism suggested a predisposition, albeit literary,
for earnest genuflection before trees, rocks, mountains, money, animals, totems and
the like. Such behavior evidenced an association between genuflector and genuflectee.
A quantitative one? - perhaps. The amount o f worshippers could be construed as a
monotonically increasing function. Should the domain be defined as the set o f all
worshippers, (each materially equivalent so as to norm alize differentials in gender,
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abilities, cetera) and the range as the set o f all objects worshipped (similarly
normalized across differentials in gender, responsibility, capacity, ecetera), the
resultant function would reflect homogeneity o f degree zero in worshippers.

A

qualitative association? - categorically so. Animism is the belief that the spirit o f the
Creator or Universal God permeates all his creations, living or dead (Akbar, 1976;
Williams 1976:246). Thus, any object whether animate or not possesses the nature o f
the Creator, is sacred, and is worthy o f deference.
Clearly, a mapping o f this qualitative association o f "spirits" would only
demonstrate the importance o f the object in quantitative terms: the greater the
gathering, the more significant that aspect o f God. And the function subsuming this
phenomenon would necessarily omit the preponderant noumenal relationship between
individual and world souls.
descriptive,

totally

Therefore, this function would be only partially

nonexplanatory,

and

completely

underdetenninistic.

Consequently, this function as an "objective" association would o f necessity vitiate
the "subjective" association from whence it was deduced and whose now reified
existence is indeterminant (i.e., the worshippers to the worshipped).

Rather, its

reified existence now presumes to symbolically characterize it within an empirical
framework using scientific language.
Predetermining either range or domain conditions the type o f mapping and
functional form the association assumes, as it does the accuracy with which the
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objective function m inors perceived reality. The possibility for bias is opportuned as
early as the abstraction o f elements or the construction o f the functional form each
association occasions. Associating ordinal sets to cardinal sets, as is the case when
human want and material want-satisfaction are related, produces an algebraic function
which reckons behavioral variation. But when two qualitative sets are associated, the
resultant function can only reckon noumenal qualities ordinally —a stark contradiction
to Einstein's assertion that the language o f mathematics must be employed to draw
quantitative conclusions (1938:27). The neoclassical approach to microeconomic
agency estranges human behavior from an association o f human want and material
want-satisfaction, the resultant function, and its task o f reckoning behavioral variation
since an open set reflecting the subordination o f needs to wants preconditions the
form (quality) o f human want (utility). The behavioral implications attending this
predetermination are held exogenous to an analysis of variation, yet inferred ex post
facto. Moreover, when these restriction are regarded as requisite ceteris paribus
normalization across associated sets, and use-value assumed inherent both human
want and material want-satisfaction, it becomes clear that value is culturally estranged
in a similar fashion from the resultant function.
Association characterizing quality cannot possibly exist independent of its
functional form. It is the function itself. Association is strictly quantitative only
when their qualitative piths are necessarily ignored or normalized (i.e., held constant)
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prior to reification. Moreover, the veracity of functional equivalency, by warranting
suspicion, must be understood to appertain to a "goodness o f fit" between explicant
and explanation, or subject and reified subject Preferences are duly metamorphosed
into not just a logistic system of quantity and space, but quantity, space and time.
Hereupon, preferences preserve their quality o f moment (intertemporality), being
predisposed to mutability and human caprice. The resultant function is monotone
increasing, which justifies neoclassical assumptions o f accumulation and insatiability
now strictly mathematically based and non-cultural. Its rate o f monotonicity reflects a
momentous substitutability of range for domain. With human want (utility) now
quantified and its noumenal cum social aspect proxied by income, it becomes subject
to neoclassical interpretation. Indifference toward sets o f material want-satisfaction
obtains to underscore material goods as objective choice and reduce microeconomic
agency to issues o f efficiency wherein those choices consistent with "rational"
behavior are least consumptive of costs (income). Consequently, the direction o f
choice becomes predictable and normative.
Thus the question is raised: can mathematical technique as a neoclassical
methodological imperative be responsible for this estrangement of quantity from
inherent quality, phenomena from inherent noumena, rational choice criteria from
inherent cultural values? Quite clearly, mathematics as an analytical technique is
absolved of responsibility for this obfuscatory estrangement For once phenomena
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are assumed at the outset to possess noumenal antecedents o f strong affect, this
problem of estrangement, as well as the explanatory power o f the neoclassical
approach which is based on variously shifting predeterminations o f associated sets,
redounds suspiciously to the normalization o f axiological postulates by the utility
function's mathematical construction.

"Nonsatiation" and "Convexity" as Deep Structural Constructs

Stansfield (1982) affirms the cultural character o f the neoclassical paradigm by
identifying the rational choice criteria o f nonsatiation as a cultural, not a natural,
human propensity, and scarcity as a relative, not a consubstantial environmental
phenomenon. In his argument against the survival o f liberal democracy in a
post-industrial West, MacPherson (1961) similarly identifies two ontological
assumptions about human nature that were posited centuries earlier by Aristotle and
later elaborated by Jeremy Bentham, and which he describes as unique to Western
social organization. Embedded within the notion o f democracy are the ontological
assumptions that man has unlimited wants and needs that he seeks to satisfy, and that
man satisfies these unlimited wants and needs through material consumption.
MacPherson presents the cosmological assumption o f scarcity as an environmental
condition. These utilitarian notions justified capitalism as a new institutional form
and the incentives required to habituate its patterned behaviors. Man, compelled as a
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bundle of appetites, strives for the satiation o f w ant Happiness obtains as a result o f
his unrestrained consumption o f utility, or the "satisfaction" provided by material
goods. Because the availabilily o f goods is conditioned by natural scarcity, man must
accumulate utility in the form o f material goods and thereby stockpile "happiness" in
order to feed his constant esuriency. Individual talent and ability determine the
amount o f utility secured and o f the level o f consumable happiness available.
Accordingly, individual worth is measurable by the breadth and depth o f quantifiable,
accumulated happiness.
Although Aristotle did earlier discount wealth accumulation as an end (see
Ethics, 1976:69, 88-90), Bentham and subsequent marginalists would later confer
upon it great behavioral significance (Bentham, 1988:70). As a consequence, wealth
would become an objective end grounded in a cosmological belief in environmental
scarcity, an ontological belief in insatiability, and a social norm encouraging "more to
less". As Nobles earlier points out, scarcity and nonsatiation as cosmological and
ontological assumptions respectively, necessarily conflate in the primary level o f
culture to support the axiological proposition "more is better" as a moral or evaluative
standard for surface level microeconomic agency (Ajani, 1991).

Rationality, as a

characteristic o f neoclassical microeconomic agency, signifies the deducibility o f
microeconomic behavior from this deep structural syllogism o f mutually inclusive
cosmological, ontological and axiological postulates. It is through socialization that
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these deep structural beliefs and values become consensual and thereby function to
normalize otherwise chaotic social interaction, to order a particularized mode of
institutional behavior, and to reproduce a particularized arrangement o f social
interactions and relationships. Because socialization endows culture with the quality
o f consensus, axiological propositions become a restricted, or "closed" set o f deep
structural valuations both quantitatively (i.e., mathematically) and, most importantly,
qualitatively (i.e., culturally). Thus, the neoclassical microeconomic paradigm is a
cultural paradigm o f reality that models a quite relative mode o f subsistence
provisioning and bio-social existence.
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CHAPTER V

MICROECONOMIC AGENCY AS META-AXIOLOGICAL DILEMMA

This chapter introduces the concept o f meta-axiological dilemma as a condition
o f African underdevelopment upon considering the neoclassical microeconomic
paradigm as a non-African interpretative model o f reality and subsistence modality.

Meta-Axiological Dilemma

The epistemological orientation of society provided for by the primary level
o f culture preconditions the conceptual organization, structure and approach to the
task of interpreting reality (Dixon, 1976; Baldwin, 1980; Akbar, 1991; Ani, 1994). In
his explanation o f how culture configures epistemological orientation and scientific
methods in consequence, Dixon (1976) asserts that the nature o f the "knower"
conditions assumptions that pattern an approach to knowledge. The philosophical
orientations inherent cosmology and ontology essentially ascribe worldviewspecificity to epistemological assumptions and methods for interpreting reality.
Accordingly, logical consistency between these cultural orientations — i.e., between
N obles' primary and secondary levels o f deep structure —establish the necessary

60
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condition for a worldview-specific interpretive paradigm o f social reality to exhibit
construct validity.11 Thus, any alternative interpretive model o f reality must be wellgrounded in accepted metaphysics, and employ accepted notions about human nature,
society and the environment (Benton, 1982).

What this implies is that while

behavioral modalities and material objects may change or even evolve in form, their
mooring to the cosmological and ontological foundations of the deep structure of
culture must remain secure. Any incongruity shown through contrastly different
social praxes exhibits much more than simple divergences in form.

Different,

antipodal praxes demonstrate cognitive differentials at the primary and secondary
levels o f culture about how the human being is to organize his/her interaction both
with and within a perceived reality.
The spatial-temporal coincidence o f antipodal axiological sets within African
society conditions a "conceptual incarceration" (Nobles, 1991b) that produces a metaaxiological dilemma o f seeking sociocultural behavioral objectives through parameters
of inappropriate social valuations.

Within the context of socioeconomically

underdeveloped African societies, the precise implication o f meta-axiological dilemma

11 Logical congruity between and among cosmology, ontology and axiology would
prov a necessary, but sufficient condition for an interpretive model to exhibit
construct validity. There would also have to be a high level of consistency between
the deep structure o f culture and its surface level. This consistency is evidenced by
nor Williams’ nor Benton’s treatment o f culture as a means of intellectual
development which conjoins idealist and materialist emphases. Their treatment
dissociates the mutual interdependence between axiology and praxis from their
cosmolocal and ontological groundings.
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for microeconomic agency as a surface level behavior involves the use o f an
inappropriate axiological set — in this case, rational choice criteria — to support,
sustain and reproduce African bio-social existence, and to promote its general welfare.
Discussing the birth o f four types o f states out o f a dialecticism between the
social and political philosophies o f endemic cultural tradition and exogenous
environmental challenges to productive modes, Diop (1991:129ff) intimates a need for
consistency between indigenous moral and human values and adapted socioeconomic
praxis should institutionalized social interaction avoid a basis in stratification.
Rodney (1972) however notes their negative association in his classic study of
African underdevelopment, pointing to a correlation between social relations and
economic activity such that the former predisposes productive and consumptive
modalities within an economy. Based on this correlation, his study affirms that the
social relations embedded within colonialism compelled, through its imposition o f an
antipodal European economic modality, the occlusion and consequent stagnation of
African socioeconomic development

Boateng (1985) similarly notes that an

inappropriate axiological set in the guise of Western systems of formal education
.disrupted the vital intergenerational transmission o f indigenous culture and resulted in
the development o f conflicting values, social disharmony and rebuffed traditions.
Akbar (1985a) characterizes the inappropriate use o f Eurocentric cognitive and
surface level behavioral modalities as supportive of the social reproduction o f the
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values, behavioral expectations and self-images o f "the middle class, Caucasian male o f
European descent" Elsewhere, he correlates psychological disorder among African
peoples with the extent to which self-rejection is employed to resolve meta-axiological
dilemma (Akbar 1991b).

African Utility

Distinctions in Deep Structure

The historical and contemporary social organization, behavior and customs,
values, beliefs and attitudes o f Africans and Europeans reflects a cultural
distinctiveness o f each (Tembo 1985). Kaunda (1966) observes an epistemological
distinction between a European "problem-solving" mind and an African "situationexperiencing” mind. Elsewhere, differing assumptions about work are indicated by
Chisiga (1973), who asserts that whereas Europeans assume man "lives to work",
Africans believe man "works to live". Distinctions in African and European cultural
deep structures have received careful attention in the work of several scholars, many
o f whom note striking similarities across various African societies in accepted notions
about human nature and social organization (see Ani, 1994; Mbiti, 1970; Diop, 1978).
This growing body o f literature, principly in the fields o f African-American
psychology, anthropology and cultural studies, provides a generalized typology o f
African deep structural constructs about the natural environment and the scope and
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nature o f the "self' or human essence that supports the formulation of a two
postulate closed axiological s e t12

Cosmology

Elemental to African social organization is the cosmological belief in a
universal oneness which permeates and infuses all that exists.

This oneness,

conceived as a vitalism or life force, defines man's continuity with all phenomena
within the world. African conceptions of this life force range from its functional
integration o f action and circumstance to the natural functioning o f all things (e.g.,
"nyama" of the Dogon, or "dya" of the Bambara) to its nature and functioning with
the individual (e.g., "okra" o f the Akan, the "chi" o f the Ibo). The internal rhythm of
this life force, Akbar (1976) points out, is maintained in social organization through
codes of morality, i.e., basic axiological notions o f self-respect and respect for others.
Rituals reinforce the interconnection between the individual and society, continually
renew and reaffirm these axiological codes, and further support the maintenance of the
life force. King (1976) maintains that the individual is vested with a spirit to sustain
life, to be creative and productive. This life force empowers life and is continually
transformed through interaction and praxis.

12 It must be pointed out that the distinctions made herein neither presume
explications of origin, historical development or genetic bases for worldview, nor
posits a linear evolution that intimates comparative worth.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Under this conceptualization, human arrangement becomes more than a
product of individuals aggregated by consensual deep structural notions and beliefs,
and physically bounded by clearly discernible demarcations.

The natural

environment, as an analog o f a life force permeating all o f reality and infusing all living
things, acquires dynamism and imbues society with life, which renders it a system of
human relations and interactions that function as a microcosm o f nature's macrocosmic
processes. Between them exists an integrative relationship o f reciprocity. Nature
cannot exhibit scarcity in what the life force furnishes or contributes through it to the
living phenomenal world; scarcity would occlude the functions o f the life force.
Rather than demonstrate an attribute o f parsimony, the natural environment —
through the life force - is capable o f sustaining manifest changes in the form or
expression o f the life force without altering its essential pith. Such changes in form or
expression are in fact consistent with known physical law (e.g., E = mc2), and serve
to balance, renew, and/or correct the relationship between man and nature.
Manifestations o f the life force are "ways o f being" that define cognitive styles and
methods used to develop and organize consciousness and transform reality (King,
1976). Because the life force predicates their mutually interdependent existence,
nature and man become extensions o f one another. Scarcity in nature, then, would
reflect human imbalance that the life force must move to equilibriate through
phenomenal transformations. Inasmuch as it is not characterized by the same intrinsic
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permanence to which European cosmology subscribes, the natural environment's
ability to provision is a function o f its relationship to man and its capacity for change
endowed by the life force.

Ontology

In addition to functioning as a vessel for the life force, man is also conceived of
as perfectible; that is, he/she strives to become a perfect reflection o f the life force
both in thought and action (Akbar, 1976; Nobles, 1991a).

This notion of

perfectibility lies contradistinct a more finite conceptualization o f man as predisposed
to the corrupting influences of base instincts and thereby prone to error and
fallability. King (1976) characterizes it as an innate drive toward changes consistent
with maturity, increased competency and equilibrium. To fully actualize human
potential and be completely and organically continuous with nature and one's social
unit is the motive for exploration, transformation, mastery and competency o f the
self. Humans are continuously driven and motivated to action and creation, which
presupposes

equality, communality, cooperation and participation

in social

arrangement

In this regard, Dixon (1976) describes activity as a spontaneous

expression o f what is conceived o f as "given" in the personality. More than a mere
expression o f impulse or desire, activity is a stressing o f being: a behavioral expression
that utilizes sensitivity to affect the phenomenal world and harmonize with it.
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N'daw (1966) notes an ontological distinction wherein the

African

conceptualization o f man, quite unlike that o f the Cartesian European emphasis on
individual insularity and uniqueness, is neither dualistic nor dichotomous. The self,
understood as an ontogenetic concept, is an interdependent entity shared with all
members of the social group. The idea o f seclusion and separateness is synonym ous
with clinically-defined madness (Akbar, 1976). Accordingly, the relationship and
interconnection between men, which places high significance on spirituality, unity and
group participation, becomes a key emphasis in African ontological principles.
An African disdain for the self as a separate and isolated entity is nourished
by the very nature of the life force, unity as interdependence and interconnection, and
social participation as a mutual expression o f both. Within an African ontological
understanding o f the human being as one in nature and is inseparable from it, humans
become the community and seek its reconstruction, not its destruction.

Nobles

(1991b) goes so far as to suggest a need to transcend finite individual definition
ascribed by one's society (see Mbiti, 1970) in order to extend oneself backward into
the collective consciousness o f the social group and thereby reaffirm unity and
interdependence. Social organizational and institutional patterns exemplify, through
social praxes,

the

concrete reinforcement o f unity,

interdependence

and

interconnection. Accordingly, discord in social praxes would necessarily evidence
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contact with and inurement of alien ontological concepts that subvert natural social
patterns and their underlying relationships and interconnections.

African Axiological Set

It is from these cosmological assumptions o f harmonious man-nature
interdependence and an ubiquitous, integrative life force, in tandem with the
ontological assumptions of perfectibility, indivisibility, and collective responsibility,
that a set of values can be formulated which orients and superintends African social
behavior and interaction. This axiological set consists in the main of principles o f
environmental harmony, perfectibility and satiation.
When considered in the context o f this African-centered axiological set, bio
social need, as defined by the neoclassical paradigm, gains significance only in relation
to a system of social and non-empirical relationships which holds little regard for
continuous material accumulation as a consumptive modality.

Contrary to the

Polanyist position, biological and social wants are not mutually exclusive under this
framework. They become identical within the African-centered axiological framework
since want does not exceed need, and equally satiable through social networks and
interaction. Herein, the sustenance o f bio-social need through material accumulation
amounts to little more than an individual self-centeredness that breaches the morality
o f indivisibility and collective responsibility which ultimately reproduces and sustains
the function and logic of the macrocosmic life force in microcosmic social organization.
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Thus, bio-social need presents itself as something to be materially resolved, then
quickly abandoned once the exigency o f need has been addressed should conditions
that foster tragedies o f character are to be avoided. Mbiti (1970:2663) treats such
conditions as a consequence o f breaking moral and ethical codes: an offense o f the
corporate social body against the life force. Evil, then, is not an intrinsic characteristic
of man or the environment

Rather, it connotes a behavior whose very nature

threatens the balance between social relations (man-man) and spiritual relations (manlife force, or God).
Moreover, the existence o f “need” bears an additional exigency beyond its
material satiation to which its psychological characteristic alludes; one that is rooted
in a noumenal “want” within human life and relationships since individual existence,
group existence, and the existence of the life force are identical and mutually
reinforcing. It is this non-material dimension o f need that Polanyi identifies as
reciprocity and redistribution, which he describes as the salient modes o f rationality
predicating non-Western economic agency (Polanyi, 1957, 1968). The satiation o f
this non-material dimension o f need presents itself as a matter o f relocating the pith o f
the life force —now merely changed in form and expression —within the man-nature
and man-man relationships. Through this acknowledgement o f the functional integrity
of the life force within both relationships do codes of morality receive continual
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validation as prescriptive guidelines for balancing both relationships, and thereby
strengthen man’s pursuit o f perfectibility in the context o f these interconnections.

Implications for Neoclassical Microeconomic Agency

The implications o f the African axiological set for the neoclassical utility
function centers on the axioms o f nonsatiation and convexity.

The axiom o f

nonsatiation endows the utility function with the property

o f increasing

monotonicity, which defines the function up to a monotone increasing transformation
or by ordinality. The function is non-decreasing in each o f its arguments, to wit:
1. monotonicity. The function is defined up to a monotone increasing
transformation:
if:

pqi > q2 , and fkk > q2

then:

Ux = / ( Pqb

> U2 = /(q ,, qa)

where: Ux = (3/(q,, q ^
or

U\ = P U2

2. ordinality. Monotone increasing transformations o f a utility function rank
higher in utility:
if:

U\ = /(p q i, Pqi) > U2 = /(q ls <&)

then: UX>U%
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and:

Uxranks higher in utility and consumer preferences.

The axiom o f convexity implicates the function’s quasi-concavity by defining
indifference curves as convex to the origin: if q! > qo, then for 0 < z < 1, zqi + (l-z)q0
> qo- More commodities are preferred to less commodities, and any combination of
commodities within the domain o f the domain and restricted to a particular level of
utility is preferred and substitutable within the restriction.
The African axiological set posits that man is both satiable and prefers only
that quanity which materially satisfies want since more creates a human condition for
the establishment and propagation o f a condition for evil conceptualized by
Africans.13 Accordingly, the incremental amount o f utility or satisfaction obtained
through consumption o f material goods beyond satiation declines precipitously.
Mathematically, the utility function now decreases at a decreasing rate from a non
zero Y-intercept representing the maximum satisfaction or utility initially obtained
(See Table 1).

13 Refer to Mbiti (1970). Evil is conceptualized as a condition o f separation,
estrangement or transgression from both God and the self. An act is characterized as
evil by virtue o f its nature, i.e., who creates the condition for or commits the
separation, estrangement or transgression from both God and the self, against whom,
and from what direction —that is, from a low level to a high level (physical to
metaphysical) or vice versa.
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Table 1
Comparison o f M onotonicity Under Differential Axiologies
Monotonicity under
European axiological set

Monotonicity under
African axiological set

if:
then:
where:
on

if:
Pq, < q , , a n d p q 2 < q 2 *
then: U, = /(P q „P qj) < U 2 = (q„ q^
where: U, = p /fa , qj)
on
PU ,<U2

Pq, > q„ and pq 2 > <k
U,
Pq„ p q ^ > U2= (q„ q j
U, = P /fa , q^
U, > PU2

where the utility function is:
• smooth and continuous
• ordinal
and acquires the characteristics of:
• quasi-concave
• monotonically increasing

where the utility function remains:
• smooth and continuous
• ordinal
but acquires the characteristics of:
• monotonically decreasing
• quasi-convex

•This is because "less" is preferred to "m ore", and need does not exceed want.

Increasing quantities of substitutable material commodities qi or q2 become
superfluous, useless and unsatisfying, which possibly further skews the non-material
equilibrium between social and naturalationships beyond human intervention and
correction. This utility function incorporating an African axiological set while holding
the physical properties of commodities constant (i.e., the neoclassical axioms of
reflexivity, completeness, transitivity and continuity) becomes convex to the origin and
declines sharply as Figure 2 depicts—which is vastly different from the neoclassical’s
depiction of the universal function in Figure l . 14 Once need is satiated, marginal utility
plunges to zero.
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Figure 2. The African-Centered Utility Function*

The use o f a Western axiological set to predicate microeconomic agency in
African society encourages permanent imbalance in man-man, man-nature
relationships while simultaneously institutionalizing a condition o f evil that Western
strategies o f development (e.g., "big push", balanced growth, "green revolution", dual
economy, export promotion, and most recently, structural adjustment) reinforce and

14 Indifference curves for the African-centered utility function would be similar to
those for the neoclassical utility function.
The difference would be that
African-centered indifference curves would depict decreasing ordinality since the
African-centered utility function decreases at a decreasing rate.
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perpetuate. Social and spiritual interconnections are shattered as a result with little
concern given equilibrating measures or a reactionary abandonment of cultural
traditions. Akbar (1991b), and to some extent Cross, Parhan and Helms (1991), treat
this situation as the basis for psychological disorders whose prominent feature
involves coping mechanisms for self-alienation. In the final analysis, the dilemma of
antipodal axiological sets that inform microeconomic agency induces a socioeconomic
schism and ultimate stagnation originating in severe intergenerational dichotomies over
preferred African (“traditional”) or European (“modem”) social behaviors that
preserve an institutional delinking of consumptive, productive and allocative
modalities.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The issue o f the transcultural applicability o f neoclassical economics wield a
certain intuitive uncertainty held insurmountable the more interminable reflection
upon it becomes. This research endeavored a focused conceptual inquiry o f the
usefulness of the neoclassical development paradigm in redressing the intractable
problem of African underdevelopment, being mindful indeed o f Keynes’ early
admonishment to locate the responsibility o f a potent idea in exorcising the obvious,
not introducing the recondite and remote (Keynes, 1964:351).
It has been demonstrated just why neoclassical microeconomic agency as it is
subsumed by theories of socioeconomic growth, is incapable o f assisting to reverse or
resolve conditions o f African underdevelopment A glaring axiological bias within
rational choice criteria supportive o f an idiosyncratic mode o f microeconomic agency
is inconsistent with African cultural orientations , organization and interactions. The
adoption of European-centered surface level praxes to both realize and sustain African
deep structural assumptions about the scope and nature o f the natural environment
and human existence induces meta-axiological dilemma, which impacts upon the
direction of development through its affect on consumptive modalities.

Thus,

75
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neoclassical microeconomic agency estranges the African economic agent from
tradition sociocultural moorings by reproducing “modem” praxes fro a behaviorally
incommodious society. Material wealth accumulation through productive capacity
becomes a disjointed and isolated affair from general social welfare as material
accumulation increases in significance as the general objective for local subsistence
modalities. This better explains the persistent social dichotomy in African societies
between the “traditional” and the “modem”. Intertemporal processes o f African
cultural rationality must necessarily find their expression through increasingly inured
alien social values as intergenerational poverty and protracted indigence — both o f
which meta-axiological dilemma encouraged and sustained as decades o f concessional
foreign aid, Western-styled industrialization and investment strategies, and structural
adjustment programs —firmly attest Current treatment o f inured alien social values,
far from being analytical in scope, appears apologetic in its support for the adoption
by the formerly colonized of “mainstream” values, attitudes and social behaviors.1S
This research, as a conceptual framework for more parturient empirical work
on antipodal self-concept and meta-axiological dilemma within consumptive and
productive modalities in African social organization, obtains significance from its
extension o f an African-centered social psychological perspective into behavioral
1S See Wilson’s (1996) analysis of new urban poverty. He argues that joblessness,
not poverty, and its effects on neighborhood institutions, social networks and endemial
behavioral patterns disassociates the inner-city from macro-societal, macroeconomic
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issues within neoclassical theories o f microeconomic agency under conditions o f
underdevelopment It provides a better elaborated basis for fuller explanations o f
persistent socioeconomic stagnation through its consideration o f those axiological
constructs and patterned social behaviors that render African society regenerative and
propagative.

As a consequence, diagnoses o f African underdevelopment become

conceptually unmoored from meaningless statistical indices and variables sensitive
only to idiosyncratic behavioral repertoires wholly inappropriate and nonconforming
to African cultural orientations.

Earlier pedestrian acknowledgments o f Western

cultural bias are thrown squarely within scholarly discourse on internecine social
psychologies to substantiate critical questions o f policy over the implementation of
“racist” growth strategies that impoverish, as well as doubt over the relevance o f their
predictive and evaluative efficiencies. Moreover, the model o f African utility can
serve to better inform and substantiate local level, community-based approaches to
African economic reform similiar in scope to the AAF-SAP which emphasizes a
broader regard for the human aspect o f socioeconomic development and its
indigenization.

processes of the “larger society', and urban residents from “mainstream” standards,
norms and values.
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